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VITAL U.S. COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
A lecture delivered by

Professor William Y. Elliott
at the Naval War College
September 21, 1949

Gentlemen:

the

The commercial and .economic policy of this cou}try is

center from which the

nourished.

goal of war production must be

War strategy, for that matter, depends today, more

than ever, on logistics.

Therefore, the health of the American

economy is a primary concern to you who are vitally , entrusted

· with the security of this country.

I have been thinking this past week a little bit about how

to set forth that problem. I have decided' to go back to the relationo

between politics and economics, at the outset, and develop from

that angle the chief strategic problems that are presented by the

economic structure of the country.

These naturally have to do,

first of all, with the total production for war that the country

can achieve.

And that is not a matter of just our own system,

but the systems on which we draw as well.

It's too simple to

day to make plans in terms of the United States as a single

economy. In point of fact, that is no longer realistic. We draw on

the economies of the world for our raw materials.

Keeping open

the seas of the world,_ therefore, becomes a matter of absolutely

vital concern, more so today than it was· in the past. We naturally
have to support alli�s in all parts of the world and that too re

quires· an enormous effort from the point of view of naval opera
tions, merchant shipping and convoying, and so forth.

We can

not fight an effective war and win it without putting men overProfessQl' Elliott is Professor of Government at Harvard University
and was the wartime Vice Chairman of WPB.
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seas under naval shelter and without controlling large areas of
strategic raw materials supply lines.
No setting of the American economy, therefore, can be
an isolationist setting in the very simple terms of considering
this economy alone. For that reason I want to deal with the com
mercial and fiscal policies of this country first in the light of the
foreign undertakings that we have made, such as the commitments
abroad, the E. C. A. and the arms program supplement to the
Atlantic Pact, but also what I think is going to be a struggle for
the backward areas of the world. How much realism is there in the
present "point four" program of the President's last inaugural
address, his "bold new program?" How much can we compete with
communism in the development of backward areas, and with what
tactics? That is the framework of what I have to talk about and I
only hope I can cover it in time.
There is a usual misconception about the relation between
politics and economics, about which I find I have to clear my own
thinking. I find it is very deeply rooted in popular misconceptions.
It is the delusion that material economics governs political action
and public policy. I want to say at the outset that it is my con
viction that politics always dominates economics. I'm quite pre
pared to admit that the instruments of production, as Karl Marx
pointed out, have a very vital, though not necessarily controlling,
bearing on all the political and social structures of the world. When
we shift over from an agrarian economy to a super-industrial econ
omy, it effects every aspect of human life. But the fact that this
system, in its handling of the control of the instruments of pro
duction (I want to emphasize that "control of the instruments of
production"), their use, their applications to human values, takes an
entirely opposed and radically different line from the totalitarian
system with which we are today in conflict-in what is called a
30
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''cold war," a "hot peace," or something else. That fact would tend
to show that the difference in the method by which we apply and

use the great techniques which modern science and industry have
furnished us may be very vital and may be indeed, the "two

worlds" dividing line. If in this system we still rely-and we do,
rely upon what
thank God-on the initiative of the individual, jf

we

is called private enterprise (and· that's a term "of scorn in some
quarters today) to create individual self reliance, to permit the de

velopment of character in our citizenship through resp�nsibility,
then all that has a very vital bearing on the whole method of econ

omic production. No one ought to know that better than someone

who was engaged in trying to plan it and trying to control it in the
last war. I did that from June, 1940, on toward the end of the war.

For a year or so, I had the civilian requirements for the war pro

duction program. Before that I had the imports, public purchases,
all the control of civilian aspects of shipping as to what came into

this country.

The order by which we administered and through which we

were able to enforce the very much gr�ater diversion of our re

sources to war, and a very useful thing to have, was the M-63

order of the War Production Board, by which we could say to

any branch chief or industry _division, "You do not get your import

ed materials unless you conform to certain rules; we are pre
pared to insist that you put most of this stuff into the war ef
fort or into the essential w:a;r-supporting effort."

A

single hold

like that means that you can supplement or direct the flow of your
resources in a very important way.

It does not. mean that you

have control over things like manpower, as we found out, of course.

It does not mean that in a war economy you have all the controls

that are necessary. The Controlled Material Plan, which was like
keeping a checking account of what we had, was an essential
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supplement, as a mechanism, for seeing that vital short ,materials
went to the right things and not the wrong things.

So I do not speak in defense of private initiative and· free

enterprise, etc./ without some knowledge of the necessity in, war

time, under conditions of shortage, of directing and controlling the

economy. But what I would like to emphasize at the outset, in order

to underline the point I have made about the supremacy of poli
tics over economics, is that, with all that

direction,

which in the

last years of the war became fairly complete in the materials field

and the production field, control was never complete or adequate

in the manpower field. And even the controls that we had were not
the

dynamics

of production.

The saving point of American production was · precisely

the fact that people were left free to adjust themselves to new

conditions, to try new experiments, to improve their own techniques,

without waiting for orders to come down from Washington. We
directed, and limited them by material end-use orders, M-orders,

and control , orders, but we did not try to plan the production of

an individual factory.

We did try to set up targets for produc

tion and ask them to adhere to them.

And I assert that that

particular method of control proved itself, in practice, to be

the

most efficient method of control that any economy, anywhere,
has ever accomplished.

I believe the record speaks for itself.

The rapidity with which changes were made and the enlistment

of· the enthusiasm and the vital energies of people who were do

ing this through a sense of "it's

our

job" were the things that

counted, just as you found it so in fighting forces, I think.

And

I believe that accounts in large measure for the superiority and

the flexibility of tactical operations of men who are trained to

take responsibility-where a sergeant can come out, as I've seen
them come out in the Argonne, commanding a company and still

82
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get it out of there-:-where a corporal will take over, if he has
to, and where a private will operate on his own,
Now I wanted to emphasize at the outset that this dy".'
namics of a free system is something that, if we lose, we lose
the key to a great part of the thing that makes the strength of
our country all through. Therefore it becomes, of extreme concern
to us to see most of the rest of the. world going along the other
line. That is our prime problem. The primacy of PO\;ltics,�
rest of the world has assumed that planning the whole of an
economy is the most efficient way to do it. They eliminate
this drive of the man who feels, "It is my job, my creation, my
responsibility. Even in the part of big business, I have a right
to rise in that and come to the top. Even if I am a worker in that
business I am not cut off from advancement, from starting some
thing of my own."
The scale of much modern business, and its operation, de
mands increasingly technical competence. There is no question
about that. They demand. abilities o:f a rare quality in manage
ment. And they demand that we recruit by "the career open to
the talented", in Napoleon's phrase, as never before. But as long
as every private has at least a marshall's baton in his knapsack,
if it doesn't come between his shoulder blades so that it sounds
like a drum, you have a free system and can do what a free
system can do. At any time that you superimpose the direction
on that system from bureaucracy, that bureaucracy becomes more
and more limited in its responses. It tends to cut off criticism. I
have felt this way myself many a time. How often did I resent
the holdup on the Hill and the investigation of something that
I thought the Congressmen cared and knew far less about than I
did, and that the consumers had far less right to judge than I
did. Surely, that is human nature. But it is a very salutary
thing, nevertheless, in spite of all the weaknesses of our system,
JlESTRICTED
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to have an accounting, to be able to be brought before the bar of
representatives who are popularly elected.
The weakness of our system, if I may say so, in terms of
this political parenthesis that I'm trying to draw around it, is that
it does not have sufficiently responsible direction and is too easily
moved by pressure groups-minorities of a very well organized type
can often push through unsound, uneconomical policies, and, if
strategically located in the big states as they are in many instances,
and in the cities in particular, they have to be bought at a terrific
price. The electoral college, which the Lodge amendment I hope will
cure in part if it ever gets through, loads the dice in favor of small
pressure groups, or highly organized, intense pressure groups. That
weakness of our political system is something that we must cure
in order to allow the national interests to be protected. But that's
another and a large story.
Now it is against this background that I want to examine
the problems that lie ahead of us. First of all, I want to examine
the scope of the economy in the United States in its relation to
other economies. I don't have to have a map here to try to point
out to you who know it, I hope, better than anybody in the
country, the extraordinary dependence of this country upon im
ports from abroad, and particularly of strategic materials.
As for stockpiling, I hope some day I'll outlive the nick
name "Stockpile Bill", but I don't ever want to live down what
is behind it, because unless we protect ourselves by adequate
reserves of the extremely critical and strategic, and particularly
the high-priority strategic material on your lists, we are never
in a position to use our total resources in the best way. You'll
still be sending convoys all around the world, dissipating mili
tary and naval forces to many sections of the world that you
ought not to have to be burdened with. · But you should have
34
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not just one years', not just two years', in my judgment, but

you should have three or four years', at the minimum, stocks

of the most critical and strategic materials which we do not have
in anything like adequate amounts even to carry on a normal effort,

much less a war effort.

That means that we are dependent on

sea control until we do get such stockpiles or imports from abroad,
many of which in the last war had to be flown into this country.

Sometimes we were days not even weeks ah€ad of the production

schedule on mica, quartz, crystal and steatite talc for condensers.

I remember the headache it was to get the latter flown from India.

Now our stockpiling policy has improved, but every time there
is a chance to cut something, that is where Congress cuts it, and

they cut it again this year.

The military budget is an extremely low budget. It doesn't

In

have a lot of pressure groups behind it.

this instance, stock

piles have against them the whole mining block of the West.

We

are not quite in the days that we were with Scrugham and his

predecessors, chiefly from Nevada, a state which has beautiful

scenery. It has advantages of other sorts, but has, about, if my
memory is correct, 100,000 people in it.
highly placed Senators.

But it has two very

They always, by seniority, get to be the

top dogs in all sorts of committees. It has only one Congressman.

On the basis of equal apportionment, it would be entitled to about

one-fifth of one congressman, but it, nevertheless, with the aid of

similar mining states, is the political power behind exploiting our

domestic resources. Naturally, there is nothing reprehensible about
this.

It is just unfortunate that the national interest should be

weighted, as I have tried to point out, in terms of this .narrow in
terest.

And you can log-roll copper and zinc, lead and silver, and

can parlay the whole thing into something staggering.

We have

a silver policy that no reputable economist that I know of has ever
been willing to defend in this country.

Your natural result is to
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build up an opposition to imports from abroad of materials of the
most important strategic character and to use the scanty reserves
that we have in this country.
Now I urge that that does not mean that we should not de
velop and explore and have ready and on tap, and even do some
marginal mining, to keep mines open, to pump them out, so that
they are at a standby condition, at any rate, in order to use them
quickly if we have to. But it does definitely mean that we had better
import and rely on materials abroad and that our commercial pol
icy should have as a prime consideration, the building of, not just
the narrowly conceived thin reserves, but long-range reserves.
What's wrong with the mine above ground in this country
instead of underground in Rhodesia? When we are giving our re
sources, as we are giving them, freely, almost throwing them away
with both hands, a good bargain along those lines would be very
interesting and useful indeed, and it is one of the bases that I hope
will be explored in the forthcoming British negotiations. We seem
to be doomed in those negotiations to keep the British up in a
style to which they have never previously been accustomed, out
now which they must be kept in if they are to keep a government
which is tolerably cooperative. The guaranty that nations used to
pay to be left alone has taken a new turn in our post-war foreign
aid. But it would seem reasonable that at some stage of these
operations that if we are going to make a big gold loan to under
write the stability of the sterling block, or if we are going to do
anything of that sort, we should get back the excess production,
the new . production, the increased production. Congress was able
to write that sort of provision into the E. C. A. Act as a part of
the E. C. A. operations, but it has come to almost nothing. Of
course, if you want to play Santa Claus, you'll never get that kind
of return. It becomes a matter of critical importance to the future
36
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. of this country. I hope you'll never forget this, gentlemen, be
cause you'll be in a position, in the Army, N_avy, and Munitions

Board, and other positions of influence, to see that the reserves,
not merely the thin strategic military reserves, but the long-range
reserves of strategic materials in this country are built up as high
as.we can.
What would be the harm of having ten years' stock of man

ganese in this country?

The steel industry is not going to quit

using manganese; the oxidation process may decrease its use, and

I'm hopeful that it will. All measures are good that may be taken

to relieve the pressure on these short materials by pilot plant

operations, by substitutes, by the kind of picture that opens up to us

now in shale oil, by which we really may become less dependent on

our dwindling natural well petroleum reserves.

All those things

should be explored, and a very important part of national investment
in our policy ought to be aimed at developing these substitutes. I

have no means of knowing whether mica spark plugs from East

Africa are necessary to you gentlemen; you thought so for your
navy planes, particularly during the war. You told me, and we went

on that basis, that substitute plugs wouldn't stand up under operat
ing conditions, that they cracked when they hit the water.
were flying the planes and we said, "O.

and we did.

K.,

You

we will get that mica,"

But it meant occupying Madagascar, among other

things, although the graphite there was equally important.

Now I'm just trying to point out the picture of the de

pendence of this country from the point of view of politics, or on

policy on imports from abroad, unless we have developed a stock

piling policy of a magnitude that we have heretofore not thought

of, unless we've got a big thick cushion that will allow us years to
turn around and change our processes.

If we try to change them

in mid-stream, in war, we run into the most unforeseen difficulties.

RE STRICTED
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They were at least unforeseen to some extent last time, but now we

ought never to claim that excuse.

We had to ch�nge over to the

lime•soda sinter process in aluminum not only for the production
of planes, but also for all the intricate uses that aluminum has,

because we dropped very nearly 100 ships in the Caribbean bringing

in the Dutch and British Guiana bauxite for Aluminum Incorporated

in Canada, British Guiana, and for Reynolds and Kaiser, and of

course for the Aluminum Company of America.

We could not

keep up that punishing loss of ships. But what did the change do?
Valves and compressors ran afoul the escort vessels.

When we

had to make that drastic change in production methods, it threw

out transportation domestically. We were shipping in gondola type
cars.

I'm just trying to show you what planning involves.

You

must foresee the results of all these actions and if taken without
preparation, and in a very short period, they tend to disrupt many

other planned operations, and to introduce new priorities into an

already inflated priority system. Iri other words, we ought to have

the maximum development of those things that we can use dom
estically and we ought to have the maximum protection in strategic
materials on hand.

And there is no earthly reason we shouldn't.

Instead of trading in the world in gold and burying it in Fort Knox,

it would be much more intelligent, surely, since no one wants gold

outside this country apparently, to take strategic materials in lieu of
gold-strategic minerals, too-they will never lose their value.

They do not need to be used immediately. Let's sterilize them, too,

to keep the commercials from worrying about the effect on the

market. But here there is a permanent source of national wealth

which the whole history of humanity has shown to be basic. Now

I'm going to drop that point, but I do want to emphasize it. It is a
keystone in our commercial policy, or should be.

It is of critical

importance to put a thicker cushion, not a thin one, not a six

months', a one year's reserve, a year and a half's, but something
that we can stretch if need be indefinitely.

38
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full use of our resources in other respects and in maximum efficiency,
naval military and air, to divert to the main job' of winning a war,
which is something that we ought to take seriously. It was a
great grief to me to have to ask for ships .when I knew the Army
and Navy were short of them; and we tried to avoid that. It
took some very heroic measures, some of which
have tried to

i

indicate to you like this change-over in aluminum, but it is a great
cost which should be awarded generally by planning ahead of time

where possible.

Now to get that into our thinking as a key story of com

mercial policy would effect a great many other things. What have
been the great keystones of our commercial policy? Let us trace
them officially and then realistically. Officially, Mr. Hull's policy

has, on the whole, triumphed. That is a policy based on reciprocal
bargains for tariffs. It isn'i free-trade. It would be a mistake to

call it that. It does use one device which tends to make trade very
much more free, namely the "most favored nation" clause in treaties.
In other words, if we make an agreement, or if France makes an

agreement with a .third party, we claim, with our commercial
treaties with France, the same rights that are accorded to that
third party in France and we give to France the same rights.
Today Britain holds, in a curious way, the key to the nat�re of our

own commercial policy.

Now the British, as usual, have had a very interesting de

vice for avoiding "most favored nation" free. trade, a device which
is called "Imperial Preference."·

We rely on the British Com

monwealth of Natio:rtS as our closest and dearest and most ultimate

support, particularly �anada, Australia, and the Dominions, but
nonetheless the United Kingdom in the long run.

Naturally the

British are aware of our dependence and they are not backward

about taking. advantage of it, if I may say so without being un-
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friendly.

They need desperately to be insured, particularly until
they assure themselves. So that from the point of view
the

of

major policies of this country, it has been a matter of critical
importance not to destroy the sterling block. That is what these

conversations in Washington are about:

To keep the British in a

position to export enough to support themselves and to keep that
economy going as far as we are able to do it.

That has meant

that we have accepted the sterling bloc though we might have

raised serious difficulties, and even broken it down had we chosen,

or could today in · ten minutes or less.

Along with bolstering up

the nations that tie their currencies to the pound sterling we have
had to accept the scheme of imperial preference which gives Brit
ish goods a preferred position in every dominion, even though

those dominions are in all respects today as independent as they

wish to be.

And we have allowed that to be called "Imperial

Preference", a family relationship you see, largely because the
British need it very desperately.

They need that tariff protection

for their exports to survive these post war years.

They were

not able to meet our competition for long years, even between
the two wars, on equal terms; they tried; they. failed.

very little problems about selling our exports.
great problems.

We had

They had very

Now viewed in terms of the classic economics that Britain

developed in the 19th century, this was a great confession of
weakness on the part of Britain, was it not?

As long as Britain

Wa!:! well head of the world, which she was, she stole a march of
40 or 50 years through the industrial revolution.

Many of the

great revolutionary inventions were the inventions of Scotchmen

and not of Englishmen, and the Scots had been running Britain

for quite a long time, as the Canadians have in some measure run us.
They transformed their whole industry by virtue of having

coal

cheap

(I underline that if you don't mind) which they could ex-

40
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, port as ballast: for· ships.

They got almost a free ride for the

rest of their cargo.·· This built up a merchant marine by quite
normal processes. They did not require a· tarjff protection. In

deed they regarded it as a species of original sin, and they at
tacked it from about the llliddle of the century in a series of very

sweeping reforms. The repeal of the Corn Laws was one of them;
the repeal of the Navigation Acts was another. They swept out
. the whole of the old protectionists' Ihercantilist system which had

constituted the empire against
�hich we had rebelled in this
.
.
country, because we didn't want to be kept as "hewers of wood,

and draw;ers of water." . Up.fortunately the Dominions which had

been relying on this protection and this preferred position in the

British market, in return of course for giving a sort of monopoly

to British goods on their own, were not equally happy with this
19th century free trade interlude. in Britain.

The Dominions were unable to develop an industry without

tariff protection, as we thought we were.

Hamilton's line in

this country had been protection of infant industry.
a good deal of sense to get an industry started.

It makes

You do have to

have some kind of pr9tection against the superior competition of
an outside fully-developed industry.

But where are you going to

capable of being put on their feet?

What kind of industries, in

draw the line on that?

What kind of industries are naturally

short, will grow up and stop being infant industries?

We never

have found an inctqs try in this · country which is willing to stop
being a baby.

They always want to continue a tariff protection

even though they don't need any possible consideration. Take the

automobile industry in this country.

Now that is the strongest

export industry in the world. They can just run anybody out of
business with cars.

And the same thing is true of automatic

machinery. We reverse the whole trend of what the British have
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had by developing the newer types of industrialism by a mass
market, and I want to underline that feature, too.
Then after World War I, the British lost their cheap coal
which had been one of their major advantages; the seams went
down and down; they employed more men and older men and less
efficient production; they did not mechanize their mines, and many
of their seams didn't lend themselves to mechanization. They
fought two costly wars, including this last one which exhausted
them in a great many ways, exhausted their ruling classes in
many ways, far beyond anything that could ever be put on paper.
Just read the honor rolls of any Oxford or Cambridge College
t·ommemorating their war dead and look at what was taken out of
British life. So I'm not trying to write a strictly economic in
terpretation of this. It was the price of empire. Empires are
fated throughout history. Take the Roman Empire. Wars killed
off the old free Romans in the struggle to rule the world as the
British have killed off a lot of their best men. So all of that should
be taken into account in tracing the decline of British power. The
destruction of Britain was very heavy from bombing. No one can
neglect that. It was estimated that they lost a total of perhaps
10 % of their effective industrial potential and a much greater
percentage in its total through housing losses, and so on.
After the war they came out an exhausted country, hav
ing lived on short rations, with a backward industry, an industry
that has not adjusted itself. But it had over years attempted to
rely upon its tariff-protected markets in the Dominions, in India
and elsewhere, on advantageous terms against outside competi
tion, or a domestic tariff protection that in 1931 outdid anything
we ever thought of in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. If we flogged
them with whips, they flogged back with scorpions. Britain raised
its tariffs sometimes to 100% by the end of 1932. Since then,
42
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Britain has been a very high tariff protection country-acknowledg

ing its defeat, the passing of its pre-eminence in its exporting
production on competitive terms-building .. up .sheltered industries
which were largely concerned with supplying the· British domestic
market. Now that was a first class tragedy, and I don't profess

to know how that could have been avoided. In the main it re
sulted from high cost British production. Perhaps if the timing of

our own tariff policy could have been different, perh_aps if Hit:'.
ler had not appeared over the horizon, perhaps if we had wisdom
beyond anything we could have been expected to have during the
twenties and thirties, this change in basic British policy need not

have happened.

But there may be some law in civilization

sometimes I'm dreadfully pessimistic about this, but I think there

is-that when people have lived softly for a considerable period

of time and have been "top dogs'�, even though they may go

through the motions, as the British certainly do, of maintaining, .
a fine code of fair play and the thing that you get in public school
or college; the "gimp" goes out of them.
struggle enough for what they get.

They haven't had to

They are like the sons of a

rich man from whfrn something has disappeared, something that's
bred of gang warfare, something that's bred by survival.

I hope

that is not a true picture of history, but it often occurs to me that it

may be personal and individual as well as national.

You shelter

your children too much and see what happens to them!

And the

whole world· we are living in today demands a degree of realism,

a degree of toughness, not offensiveness but just steel, that is
testing nations as well as men.

Now this passing of the pre-eminence of the British, has

thrust on us at the end of this war an entirely unlooked-for bur
den, unprepared-for burden.

We should have foreseen it, but

people never foresee things. We never learn anything except
through the most painful experience.

RESTRICTED

That is. just human nature.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

48

15

RESTRICTEDNaval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 3, Art. 3
We suddenly had to substitute for Britain as the world's banker,
as the world's clearing house, as the world's center of trade and
production. We had over half the industrial production of the
world at the end of the war and I suspect we still have pretty
close to that percentage. I am not talking about the total of cill
production, just industrial. We had this tremendous capacity that
had been created in mass production, large scale markets, which
effects everything. It effects research; it effects economies and
management. Sometimes when you consider our anti-trust policy
you ought to think very seriously of what would really happen if we
did succeed in unscrambling all the big business in this country.
We would become, very shortly, a very different figure in world
power.
Now to control those big businesses is extremely essential,
but to unscramble them and to do what so many of our bright
boys who have a slight leaning toward Moscow would like to do,
would be disastrous. We must confront the fact that if you did take
those great units that put thirty or forty million dollars into re
search a year and scramble them up into little ones, how much
would be put into research a year? You would do something
very important to this country and very disastrous in the point of
view of its power. I'm not going to name names or draw pictures,
but that has to be thought of! To control big business units, to
keep them under control in terms of seeing that they do not ex
ercise the powers of monopoly in politics, and that they are kept
to the honest job of production and pricing on the basis that
they should do, is another matter and requires perhaps a different
technique. It may, in my judgment, require government participa
tion through public trustees who are in the position to open up every
book and learn what is being done and reveal everything that is be
ing done. I'm not sure that government participation in terms of
share-owning might not be absolutely essential in all the public
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utilities anyway, but I wouldn't want to turn them all under to be
run by a state controlled, socialized, bure3:ucratic body. I tried to
run 1500 people in that way. That is not a very large amount; you
can run thousands or more in your own shows. But it is enough;
it is a big headache. And when you try to get rid of the deadwood
in a bureaucracy just see how much· luck you have! Well, I did.
· I pared my office down to about one-third its former size, and it
worked very much better, but I couldn't have done it in peacetime.
And when I got to that point, I had to stop paring, because I would
have pared the gizzard out of it and leave a lot of deadwood because
of Civil Service. That is a fact.
In other words, if you are thinking about socializing, consider. well the instrument of socializing, the nature of the problem,
the fact that in order to operate you have to protect ev�ry flank
rear, center, and' everythi:p.g else-and still you don't get any
where. You are wrapped up in so many layers of red tape and in
the battle of political pres,sures that by and large your freedom to
initiate, to improvise, to create, to do something, is frittered away
in the battle of memoranda. That is a heart-felt confession for one
of my temperament, my academic profession, for you never saw
an academic fellow yet who didn't want to get a tied-in, neat,
wrapped-up package that would make sense in terms of a logical
arrangement! But bureaucratic planning looks better on paper
than in practice.
It· looks like it makes sense to pool everything and have one
state of control for the whole business. That is what seduced
soft minds about the delusion of communism. They think this total
planning makes sense. This is the way to get things like a solar
system. I'm sure my astronomer friend Harlow Shapley, who
wants to build a peace bridge for the Russians, must feel this
way about "social planning", "scientific planning". He uses his
RESTRICTED
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view quite usefully sometimes, from their point of" view. He is as
good an American as I am ; I'm convinced of that. He is no com
munist. I don't think he is, in the proper sense, a fellow traveler,
although he gets used so much in Russian inspired "peace move
ments" today that it is hard to distinguish. I am sure that he,
fundamentally, isn't. He is just seduced. The heaven that he star
gazes at looks like order. Maybe he looks at a picture of the
planned system controlled by the Kremlin and that looks like order,
too. But underneath that "order", if anyone looks closer; there
are, at least 12,000,000 political prisoners enslaved to create that
order. The whole Moscow system is a seething kind of caldron of
intrigue and conspiracy and of purges. You have only got to
read Kravchenko's very honest account to see what the picture
is like. It is a funny kind of order, but it looks like an order that
makes sense, if you just get a central control thing. Communism
promises that when society has all been purged of capitalism by
it's dictatorship of the proletariat, the societies can be turned
loose. As a matter of fact, societies and nations that fall under
communist sway are never turned loose. You've heard about
Lysenko and you know that biology had to be rewritten in the
Soviet Union to fit the party line. So has art, music and everything
else. And you would think that these unhappy intellectuals in our
country would begin to understand that this Russian party line
thought-control is the slavery that they are most afraid of, whereas
we have given them an unparallel freedom-a freedom which they
have not lived up to, which they frequently abuse in this country.
But· alas, it is the nature of the beast that he always thinks that
far hills are greener. Now I introduced that because I think it
has a very important bearing on our. commercial and economic
policy.
The trend toward planning all the details on economy is a
very seductive trend to bureaucratic, to intellectuals, to people who
46
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think that to make sense out of it is to-get everything in a pack
age and to put it under a single pattern and to blueprint it and
there it is. That isn't the way things are actually done, though

there are some things that you have to do that way.

When you can control all the factors in an equation, that

is right enough. But in order to do this total planning you really
must control all the factors in th.e equation and that means con
trolling what people think, what they are educated in, their res

ponses. Of course,-you must condition them Ulre animals in Pav
lov's laboratory, or condition their reflexes. You must malte them
respond and keep them completely. cut ·off from all outside poison,
dangerous ideas, any ideas, except those of the party-line "agita

tion" that plays on emotions, and propaganda that is fed to them
at all stages.

Now that might be a very .attractive road. For some people
it is. It would seem to solve a great many problems, commercially,
economically and otherwise, if . we could plan imports arid our ex-:
ports just the way Russia does, to have them all bought through
a single state trading trust, plan them out in production through a
single state trade trust, plan them out in production through a series
of trusts who are making their deals with each other but who are all
on the Goss .Plan. Unh'appily, Vossnoshensky, the head of Moscow's

previous plans, seems to have been eliminated as head of the "Goss

Plan.''

He didn!t quite make the grade.

Vargas, their leading

economic expert, and a great man from the point of view of the

Russian Academy, had to recant all his honest doctrines and come
up with some new ones to fit the party line. And the great difficulty

about this system is precisely that to get

real

rulers you can hard

ly ever succeed if you spiritually castrate people and expect them

just to obey or turn them into Janizaries, like those of the old
.Turkish empire. You can get admirable robots or automata, but
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you can't get men with alert critical minds ready to meet new situ�
tions. Stich rulers are' going to begin to behave according to,JL
stupid pattern because they have been conditioned, not trained

to think. And I think we have had plentiful evidence. of that. Jf
you had been playing the Russian line after this war, would you
have made the incredible mistakes that the Politburo and the
Kremlin have? You might have had the world on a silver platter if
your manners had been good. Roosevelt had dished it all out. to

them. It was theirs for the taking. All that they had to do was to
avoid showing this offensive, aggressive and uproarious kind of
condemnation of all the outside world that Mr. Vishinsky and Molo
tov have treated us to ever since and that Stalin has underlined from
his base back home.

If they had chosen to do it, they need not have provoked
the Marshall Plan. All they had to do to kill the Marshall Plan was
to . come in on it! It is natural, I think, that the rulers who are

educated and chosen this way have a stupid set of responses, and

I think these are the party line responses. They are the victims

of their own lines and of their own method of propaganda. They get

it back. in Intelligence quite often, although they have excellent
Intelligence, if they could use and interpret it correctly, since they

know what is going on everywhere.

Their fifth column seeps

through and permeates very unpleasantly-things that we are be

ginning to find out now, and we have pretty definite evidence of it,
high up and low down. But to

interpret

Intelligence is the whole

business, isn't it, in order to use it? What do you do with it? If it

is "agin" the party line, it ain't so! Therefore it is very dangerous

to put back into circulation to Moscow, facts that would not square

with fixed· party-line expectations.

So I say that the test of the conflicts of these systems is,

ultimately,· what

they do to the human beings in them.
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the confused and bewildered people, as we frequently are, we can
at least try to see daylight in·our own way. The sum total of our
free system, for all its defects, is considerably more effective, as
far as one can see short of atomic destruction by surprise, in
reviving the rest of the world and making a go of it in spite of
all the weaknesses.
Now we have staked very desperately on creating a world
that will not be out of balance, where there won't be a free or
der, That is our whole commercial economic policy, dictated by
our political policy and by high strategy. This is a conclusion com
ing from observations as Staff Director for the Hester Committee
and the Foreign Affairs Committee during these critical times, and
consultant for writing the European part of the Post War Econ
omic Policy and Planning (the Colmer) Committee in the House
in 1945. No one can tell me that the E. C. A. Program would
ever have gone through Congress on any other basis than that
as a buffer against Communism. Would it? Certainly not. Not
in the magnitude that it did go through. But the Congressmen
could see one very simple thing. They could see well enough that
if we left Europe in the powerless state, the economic and politi
cal vacuum that it was at that time with the Communist parties
making gains in the elections and with the rations dropping be
low the subsistence level in a great many European countries after
the droughts of 1946-47, that we might well lose the war, the peace
and everything else. And painful as it was they went down in
Uncle Sam's pocket and dished out five billion plus for the E. C. A.,
and some odd sums here and there of other sorts. And they will
continue to do it, probably, in spite of a great to-do about diminish
ing the amounts. But, if you total all foreign aid and military pro
grams, the sum total will not be very far from half our annual
Federal Budget if we add the one billion three, which Congress now
seems to be in a frame of mind to put in for the arms program, and
RESTRICTED
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which is absolutely essential to make any sense of the whole thing.
Add this to what they have voted on the E. C. A. program and
they will, in effect, have just about balanced up somewhere over
five billion dollars for foreign aid, alone. If you add Japan onto it
and our other commitments, it wHl just about tally out. Five billion
dollars out of a national income like ours, which may run to two
hundred fifty billions today, is not an excessive percentage, but
it is a right large sum of money. It represents tremendous amounts
of natural resources, and of the use of man power, and of commit
ments in taxation, and all sorts of other things.
Now we have had to do that because just free-trade, just
Hull's reciprocal trade agreements, could never in the world have
pulled us out of this business. They didn't fit the world that we
were living in. And the I. T. 0., the International Trade Organiza
tion in which this international freer trade charter at Geneva and
then Havana has been worked out, is before Congress and looks as
if it might go through. This would attempt to anchor Hull's pol
icies and to make them universal in the world outside the Rus
sian satellite block. But it is a program that will have no real
meaning in practice in the world we are living in for several years,
or at the minimum, ten years, maybe more, maybe never. I think
it is important; I think it is useful to do although I think that we
have tied our hands, perhaps excessively, in some of the com
promises negotiated and that there are details of it where we were
just plain out-bargained. But when you go into a conference, you
have to depend upon the people that you have got, and if you don't
breed tough bargainers anymore, and if you are in the hands of
boys who think the success of a conference is to be measured- Ill
terms of everybody going home feeling good, then concession for the
mere sake of conciliation is the natural outcome.
The renewal of the reciprocal trade agreements is en-
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couraging. We certainly must accept more goods from abroad if
we are ever to be repaid anything. We never can be repaid in the
staggering sums of money we put into len{l-lease, 50 billion dollars,
during the war. We never can be repaid, I think, by the kind of
Europe that I am looking at today. The
• loans that we made�post
war surplus property-were just given to them. _In effect, we took
blocked currencies, but who is ever going to UI!:block those cur
rencies? We don't even get the right to send out students and
professors abroad without clearing them with forejgn govern
ment to suit their needs, not outs.' The Fullbright_ Act which is
supposed to do that has been so mismanaged that now the other
countries determine whether I go over there as a research professor,
not my country. That is a fact. You wouldn't believe it possible
but that one little item is all that has resulted in getting a few mil
lions of dollars for educational purposes abroad back out of all these
billions. It has. really come down to something not unlike that. The
selections of the ,ru.Ubright people this year came just this month
(September) after these boys had to make up their minds to stay
on at their· colleges or not. They couldn't book passage so late, so
some just said, "No thank you, we'll stay home." But I'm an in
terested party here. I see it from the point of view of scholars,
of students who might be very useful to us abroad in various
ways. And it is impossible for us to select them. We have actually
let that get out of our hands in our settlements under the Full
bright Act.
Well I say we are not going to collect that. If we collected
all the Fullbright funds, maybe we would collect perhaps $100,000,000 or so, out of the four or five billions,. the minimum of sur
plus property, the loans that we made or the post war lend
lease, the continuation of lend-,lease, the three billion seven hundred
and fifty millions that we gave to Britain to try to stabilize them be
fore we putin the lend-lease, out of all of this tremendous program
RESTRICT�D
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on the back of UNRA, into which we put, roughly speaking,

nearly three billion dollars. That is a right tidy sum! It amounts,

according to the best calculations I have at this time, in post-war

additions to the fifty millions of lend-lease, to pretty close to twenty

six or twenty-seven billion dollars total. That is not chicken feed,

even in a country like ours.

Now it has had advantages. There is no question at all that

this export has enabled us to continue a high level of prosperity
in this country. We could have done it by giving it away at home,

and that has been strongly suggested by the people who would like

to pursue that method in what is miscalled the "Welfare State." But

we did it abroad on the grounds that we were stabilizing the world.

Now let us look at these recent conversations of the Brit

ish. They have been the testing point, in my mind, and they are

not through. This is just the first round in determining what kind

of world we are really getting out of all this. Very little has been
done so far by these countries to put themselves permanently on a

competitive basis that will enable them to sell in dollar markets,
and that is what they have got to do.

The dollar shortage that

looks them in the face is appalling and has hardly been honestly

faced. I don't want to brag, but if you go back and read the Hes

ter reports, that is those of the Select Committee on Foreign Aid,

and look at those tables and graphs and the comments on the first
proposals of the 0. E. E. C., you will see that that committee alone

called the trick correctly. It showed that without full German pro
duction and European integration as an economy, the dollar gap

would remain very large by 1950. But of course nobody paid any at
tention to that report in the working out of E. C. A. policy.

Ger

many's industries went on being dismantled and Britain turned its
back, in fact, on getting a real integration of Western Europe in

order to maintain its own national and imperial yearning under
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socialism in one state. It was just another �ongressional document,
and it was drawn up tentatively. And after all, the Harriman Com
mittee had gone over the same ground and the Krug Committee had
gone over it; and everybody else had gone over it. The best anyone
could hope was that the Marshall Plan countries would wind up

.

.

about a billion short in 1952,- which they thought the world bank
could handle in terms of a dollar shortage. That was the original
estimate, slightly over a billion. It looked nearer three billion

(and it even might be four billion)· to us, because the things that
they were asking and projecting to do was imJ)ossible ! They
could not increase the exports of Britain by - l'.75 or .even by
f

150

per cent in volume. Who was going to buy them? Who could pay
for them? Whererwere these exports going to be sold, particularly

in dollar markets with British goods in some cases 100% above
our own in goods and costs? The West Indies sent a little list. They
said, "What are we going to do? We like to buy British goods,

but not at 100% more in price!" When even ship-building gets
to be more expensive in England than ship-building in New Jer
sey, that is a scandal. And-this was a selected item. I wish I had

time to develop what seemed to me to be the reasons behind this
British business decline� But· the same thing that is true of Brit

ain is also true in a lesser degree of France. Both can be helped
temporarily by devaluation. That is what they have done, because
the British then have a way of scaling down wages among other
things, at domestic cost, except where the import prices rise com
mensurately.

Their costs may rise from five to ten per cent,

whereas they get the temporary advantage of selling at a pound

that is now

$2.80,

not

$4.00.

that, but I hope they can.

be lucky if they
30% devaluation.

They will

That is

can hold

What happens if they don't hold it? What happens if they

inflate in England? They have had a concealed inflation for a long,

long time, very well concealed by the efficiency of their price con-
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trol mechanism, and the fact that they control all their imports.
They did a lot better job of controlling imports than I did last
time. I just controlled a minimum part, but a very important part,
of our production. The imports of Britain control pretty nearly
anything they want, since so much of all British production is tied
to imports.
What happens if they do not increase the efficiency of their
labor, or alternatively work longer hours? They are right back
where they started. And no taking down of tariffs, even if we
removed every tariff in the country, would cure that problem. They
must cure it themselves. Whether they are capable of curing it
through the education of the trade unions, I don't know. They
have come a long way, but their philosophy has, in the process,
hardened into one of austerity and sacrifice and limitation, instead
of production. And in that simple formula I think you can express
the difficulties that Britain is having and will have until they can
unleash the incentives that a man has in this simple way: If his
wife wants a washing machine and if he works a little harder or
better, he can get it. Now that seems a very small matter, but it
is almost the secret of the American system. You know you can't
do much about increasing your own productivity because you and I
are on salaries. But I come running down here to do what little I
can about it. It is human nature. You will work harder if you can
get something for it. You won't work harder if two-thirds of all
your rationed food is subsidized up to fifty per cent by the aid of
Uncle Sam. That is what is true today, or thereabouts-not quite.
If your housing is kept on a subsidized basis and you are putting
your capital investment into that, if you are given false teeth, a
wig, spectacles, if you line up long enough for the doctor to get
around to it, and for the production of spectacles, etc., to catch up
with the demand, all that is a public expense. Maybe it is a welfare
state. It certainly isn't Moscow; it doesn't look toward Moscow,
54
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immediately. But see what happens if you carry on that welfare
state, and get people in a position where they expect to te sup
ported in this way, and somebody comes in that promis�s that he
will give them all that, and more too. He won't be named BEVIN,
probably, but he might be named BEVAN. And when' he does give
it to them or tries to give it to them, he wants to control· them
sure enough! The directed labor that hasn't really been put into
effect in England would have to be put in. He would have to crack
down, and when you get that kind of an apparatus, you've got
something quite different from the democratic. soc�alism of Brit
ain today and the perfectly constitutional kind of labor party that,
t!lank God, is still running Britain. .-.·
So we have to help these fellows, if we can, to help them
selves: But they make it. awfully hard for us,·· and the more we
help them without demanding any conditions, the harder it- gets.
And if we demand any conditions, why that is imperialism, that is
meddling. You are, more or less, damned if you do and damned if
you don't. That is the unfortunate position of the benefactor. Re
member we no longer even talk of "loans" ; everything is a "grant."
Now how different is this picture from the one that we
looked at when Britain was growing up! Britain's export of capi
tal abroad was in the form of loans, not gifts. She rode out a rather
�omfortable and easy living· throughout the later nineteenth cen
tury and part of the twentieth on the basis of those loans. Well,
until 1938 her balance wasn't really unfavorable because she was
getting back---:-what doe& the Board of Trade figure-two hundred
eiihty-five m.illion .pounds a year from the incoll\e on those invest
ments abroad. Sile had about three billion and a half pounds in
foreign investments, roughly. speaking----pounds, not dollars.
ltemember that. Multiply by four or five, now: by two point eight,
USTIUCTBD
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but not then. That is a tidy sum for a population of forty-five mil
lion people. They were cushioned by their previous investments.
We are not building up any such fat for our old age.

In

vestments abroad that can be collected are very very scanty in

deed. Maybe that will protect us against the kind of fate that hap

pens to fat people in their old age. Maybe this will keep us lean and
It may be the best thing that ever hap

working for somebody else!
pened for us.

You can take that line but it's a little difficult to

sell to Congress. But, in the meantime, we are desperately staking

on trying to get Europe to unite-first, militarily; second, econ

omically, if we can. That is very important, because neither Brit

ain, nor France, nor any other European country, even Germany,

the truncated Germany that we have today which has the great
est industrial potentials in Europe, is capable of supporting itself
and its population as an isolated unit.

It would be folly to allow

Europe to build up sixteen national sovereignties.
aren't letting them do it in the arms program.

I hope you

If you are, you

are just dishing out money. You are not building a real arms pro

gram of European security if you allow them to build up separate

arms programs, separate weapon types, not to keep the heavy stuff

here where its production is relatively safe and we can always hold
it. I hope you aren't, but you probably are!

We must desperately try to make conditions for our own and

Europe's future health, if we are to continue this foreign aid that

will create the advantage of a large scale market.

Europe then

should become a united, even a federated, business, in a loose way,

with a common currency, with a common hold above all. France, for

instance, is never going to amount to the great world-shaking power
that France loves to live on in dreams of the past.

The French

people are well aware of it. But France can be a leading factor in

modern Europe, with two hundred fifty million people, with all the

56

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss3/3

RESTRICTED
28

Elliott: Vital U.S. Commercial and Economic Problems

RESTRICTED

colonies of Europe. And still there remain the colonies in Africa, at
least, because they are not fit to be self-governing and anybody who

tells you so has a party line to Moscow or is talking nonsense. You
can't turn Africa even into a low-grade local Tammany Hall.
That is the closest thing I can get to it. All that ki:g.d 8f an area,
with its natural resources of the world, ought to b� a third power in
the world that we must create if we are ever to get out of this un
fortunate condition with Russia, which we alone a.re holding. And
we have to stake very desperately. So far we have assured Stalin
by our acts that we are "green" and poor bargainers.

We have had nationalism to deal with, and can't handle it.
Stalin thinks he can and has. Maybe it couldn't have been done any
other way. We haven't m:ade very great progress, but even in the

limited time that our commercial and economic policy has been in
effect, we have certainly seen the world turn the corner. The

communists have never won an election victory in a free country

since the E. C. A. went into effect. They have lost ground, terrifical
ly, in free elections. They have lost it in Germany; lost it in France;
lost it in Italy. And that alone was probably worth the E. C. A.
But these gains must be held; must be turned into something per
manent to get these fellows off relief and on their own. Our play is
certainly turning out well, to some degree, in the west. And the
Atlantic Pact is turning into something that goes beyond that.
For Western Europe, Britain is not enough. The Sterling block is
not enough. All Western Europe has to be a unit, if it is to sur
vive against the colossus of Russia. And it can survive once that
kind of force is created in the world, if it can be. I'm not unaware

o;f the difficulties in this problem. I've studied them very closely,

been on the spot in every country there, talked with their taxi

drivers, workers and. farmers, as well as their statesmen. I know
what an heroic job this is. But if we are going to underwrite this

world aid indefinitely, haven't we a right to propose to them that
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they meet the conditions that will some day lift them out of this

morass, and that they shan't perpetuate something which con

tinues this incredible kind of situation, where they depend upon
our bounty from year to year as to whether they will continue to

exist or not? The sooner we face that, the sooner we make them

face it, the sooner our commercial policy will make sense.

I wouldn't try to take away from them the rights of dis

crimination against this country, even.

I think they will have to

right to discriminate with each other.

I hope I make that clear.

keep such tariff protection.

But I would certainly take away the

That to me is the cardinal point in our policy at this stage.

I

think that we have not made it very vigorously, but we have
learned a great lesson.

The devaluation of the pound was some

thing of a triumph from the point of view of realism. It is going

to be very hard for the British Labor Party to support it.

ought to be sympathetic with them.

We

In that way there are some

signs that we are coming of age. There are signs that our leaders

are beginning to understand and to assume the role of people

who have to see that what we do is not thrown away, that all these

efforts, and they are very great efforts, come. to some fulfillment.

This must be a fulfillment not just in terms of our own advantage,

because it never will be just that, but a fulfillment in the sense that
we have a world that we can live in, and breath in, and in which

free men can once more face the future with some assurance.
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U.S. News and World Report. January 27, 1950.
"To Prevent War"

by Bernard Baruch. Reader's Digest. February.
t•what Can We Expect of Europe?"

by James Burnham. The American Mercury. February.
"Our Worst Blunders in the War - Japan and the Russians"

by Hanson Baldwin. The Atlantic. February.
ttAir Force on Russia's Border"

by T. V. Graves. Flying. February.
"Formosa--Hot Spot of the Bast"

by Frederick G. Vosburgh. The National Geographic
Magazine. February.
t1The Missing Key to U. S. Policy"

by Michael A. Heilperin.
"Two Geostrategic Maps"

(illustrated) Fortune. February.
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"Science and Politics in the 20th Century"

by James B. Conant.
"Tito: A Study"

Foreign Affairs. January.
"Strategic Implications of the North Atlantic Pact"

by Bernard Brodie. Yale Review. Winter, 1950.
"World Policy Makers Discottnt War"

(an Editorial) United Nations World. February.
"Biological Warfare-The Equalizer"

by Lt. James B. Kelley, USNR.
"Jarvis: Destroyer That Vanished"

by Cdr. James C. Shaw, USN. U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. February.
"The Hydrogen Bomb: Strategy of Despair"

New "'8.epublic.
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